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The Death Penalty and
the Insanity Defense
Hans Zeisel*

Thomas Whisenhant, a white man in his thirties, married and the father of two small children, had committed four unconnected murders:
On November 21, 1975, he walked into a convenience store in a Mobile, Alabama, suburb
and shot a 27 year-old woman in the head with a
pistol. The woman fell dead behind the counter.
He possibly beat or kicked her in the groin after
the shooting. He left the cash drawer untouched.
On April 19, 1976, he accosted a 44 year-old
woman with the same pistol at a similar convenience store in the same Mobile suburb. He
forced her to leave the store with him in his
pick-up truck and took her to a remote farmhouse where he made her undress. He shot her
in the head. No rape, sexual molestation, or
robbery occurred. The next day he returned
and mutilated the body with a knife by cutting
off her breast and slitting open her abdomen.
He returned later for more mutilation, but the
corpse had been found by the police.
On October 8, 1976, he abducted another
woman, 24, from a similar convenience store in
the same Mobile suburb. He took her to an isolated field near his home, forced her to undress
and raped her. He then shot her in the head and
returned the next day and similarly mutilated
her body. He was seen near the body by a local
farmer and apprehended by the police shortly
thereafter. Upon capture, he thanked the officers for catching him and made a full confession. Probing his background revealed that he
shot and killed an elderly woman when he was
fourteen, but was not convicted because of in*Professor Emeritus of Law and Sociology, University of
Chicago.
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sufficient evidence. He subsequently admitted
this fourth murder.
At the time of the most recent murders, the
defendant was on parole after having served
seven years of a twenty-year federal sentence for
assault with intent to kill a female civilian employee on an Air Force base while in the military.
Whisenhant had not known any of the five
women he assaulted.
The state of Alabama indicted him for capital
murder for the last killing because it involved
the statutory aggravating factor of rape. A distinguished private psychiatrist employed by the
State Mental Hospital to head a lunacy commission testified that the defendant was legally insane; his testimony was rebutted by a state employed psychologist who testified that the defendant was sane.
Under Alabama law, the jury, if it found the
defendant committed the crime, had only two
alternatives: to find the defendant guilty and
impose the death penalty, or to acquit him for
reason of insanity; the jury could not convict
him of a lesser included offense and could not
impose a different sentence.
The jury convicted. After such a conviction
Alabama law provides for a hearing before the
trial judge after which he must decide whether
to impose the death penalty or sentence the defendant to non-parolable prison for life.
In the sentence hearing in the Jefferson Circuit Court of Alabama, the prosecution called
three witnesses: the police chief, a psychiatrist,
and a psychologist. Counsel for the defendant,
Morris Dees, the director of the Southern Poverty Law Center, had asked me to testify at the
hearing. I was qualified primarily as co-author
of TheAmeican jury, and as author of "The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty."' The court
was informed that I had read the essential parts
'H. Kalven, Jr. and H. Zeisel, The American jury, Little
Brown & Co., 1966; University of Chicago Press, 1971. H.
Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts vs. Faith,
1976 Supreme Court Review 317.
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of the trial record. What follows is my testimony
as dictated after the hearing from my notes.

"Your Honor,
The crime for which this defendant was convicted was a horrible one, and the defendant is
clearly a very dangerous person. Moreover,
whatever the jury judged him legally to be, he
was obviously a sick person, or at least a person
with sick inclinations.
The defense in the case was insanity and the
jury responded in a predictable and, I might
add, sensible manner. Given the choice between
finding this defendant not guilty by reason of
insanity and finding him guilty, the jury had no
doubt. Knowing that what it wanted to achieve
was the permanent removal of this defendant
from society, it considered the guilty verdict the
safer way of achieving this end.
I do not know what the jurors in this case
thought the consequences of an acquittal by reason of insanity would be. Normally, if the jurors
ask the judge about these consequences, he instructs them that this is none of their business.
At times it is even suggested to the jury that
there is no way of telling how soon a defendant
acquitted by reason of insanity might be released. The jury in such cases makes it its business to remove the defendant permanently by
finding him guilty.
The jury's common sense requires disregard
of the various Latin and Greek names psychiatrists use, and of the nice distinctions they and
the law make between mental disease and personality disorder. In short, the jury in such a
case finds little merit in the insanity defense; if
permanent removal is the issue, conviction of
such a defendant appears as the only rational
solution.
I might add that in our comprehensive study
of thejury in criminal cases, Harry Kalven and I
found precisely this reaction.' In a case involving a similarly terrible crime, the jury brushed
the insanity defense aside and convicted the de'The American Jury, p. 403.
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fendant. In that case, the trial judge informed
us that, if there had been a bench trial, he would
have had to find the defendant insane. Significantly, he refrained from setting the jury's
verdict aside, thereby expressing agreement
with the jury's common sense.
It would be a mistake, therefore, to conclude
from the verdict of the jurors in this case that
they consider the defendant to be sane; in a case
such as this the jurors will find the defendant
guilty even if they or the psychiatrists consider
him insane.
The truth perhaps is that a case like this,
which defies human understanding, also defies
psychiatric knowledge such as there is. One can
but marvel at how psychiatrists can say with certainty, as they did today in this case, that the
"irresistible impulse" was operative only at the
time the defendant dismembered the dead body
of the victim, but not at the time he killed. In
any event, the question of insanity is dwarfed by
the patent dangerousness of this offender and
the overpowering, agreed upon need for his
permanent removal.
The question of insanity, however, is not
dwarfed by, but is central to, the decision this
court must now make as to which form the removal of this defendant should take; whether he
is to be removed by execution or by the nonparolable prison sentence for life which Alabama law provides.
Alabama law, as I read it, lists the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances this court may
consider and weigh, but the law does not say
how this weighing should be done. It does not
say, for instance, that the court must count the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and
then, if there is a majority of aggravating circumstances, impose the death sentence. The law
leaves the decision to the discretion of the court.
At this point it becomes important to consider
the presumed function of the death penalty. If
its function is retribution, the court could simply
say that this crime ranks among the most inhuman and senseless murders ever committed;
4

hence if there be a case which under the law
deserves the death penalty, this surely is the one.
But retribution alone, according to the law of
the land and according to our morals, is not any
longer a sufficient ground for the death penalty.
In Gregg, the United States Supreme Court discusses two functions of the death penalty: its
deterrent effect and its retributive function, the
latter reflecting the community's outrage over
the committed crime. The Court leaves no
doubt as to which of the two functions it considers the more important. And, I believe, if the
Justices were not convinced that the death penalty had a deterrent effect, it is doubtful that
they would have sustained its constitutionality.
Indeed, it is the belief of those who advocate
and defend the death penalty that its primary
purpose is to save lives by deterring would-be
murderers. A person or, for that matter, a
court, convinced that the death penalty is not a
deterrent, could not well defend it. The important question, therefore, is whether in a case like
this the death penalty is an effective deterrent.
Here first is the summary of careful scrutiny
of the many available studies of the problem: If
there is an overall deterrent effect of the death
penalty, it can only be minute, since not one of
the many research approaches-from the
simplest to the most sophisticated-was able to
find it.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Gregg nevertheless believed that in certain situations the death
penalty may be an effective deterrent. The
Court cited three examples: the hired killer, the
murder for gain, and the so-called "freemurder," the one committed by a defendant
serving a life sentence in a jurisdiction that does
not have the death penalty. There is no need
here to discuss these examples. For our purpose
here it will suffice to see what all three examples
have in common: they are highly rational murders, murders in which the consequences of the
deed are coldly calculated.
From these examples of the type of murder in
which the death penalty might conceivably de-
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ter, it is impossible to envision how the execution of this defendant could have a deterrent
effect. His crimes were surely not of the calculated sort. Even if these crimes were, as the psychiatrists today have asserted, on the sane side
of the borderline that divides insanity from sanity, they are certainly close to that line--sick
crimes of a sick person; this is how they seem to
us laymen-jurors, judges, professors. Even the
psychiatrists might agree that the closer a crime
is to the pathological borderline, the less likely it
is deterrable.
There is even important evidence to the effect
that for such crimes and such a criminal the
death penalty might be a negative deterrent, i.e.,
an invitation to commit murder as a means of
committing suicide with the help of the law.
There is both statistical evidence and substantial
evidence from psychiatric case studies of the
existence of such a negative deterrent effect. 3
We all remember Mr. Gilmore in Utah who
committed an absolutely senseless crime under
circumstances that made his capture certain,
and eventually left no doubt that what he
wanted was to die.
The improbability that crimes such as this defendant's can be deterred is reflected in the attitude of the common law which reduces the degree of responsibility for crimes that are close to
the pathological borderline. While such closeness might not remove the defendant's responsibility under the law, it often reduces that
responsibility, thereby reflecting the sound view
that criminal responsibility is not necessarily a
dichotomous yes/no decision but a question of
degree.
The closeness to the pathological borderline
raises still another issue. Being one inch on one
side or the other may not only be the difference
between death and life, but the difference between death and not being tried at all. Sometimes the psychiatrists have different opinions,
which only emphasize the slimness of the mar'The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, p. 342.
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gin by which a case may be removed from the
borderline.
One cannot help seeing the parallel between
this present case and the by now famous New
York case of the Son of Sam. There the first two
court appointed psychiatrists found the defendant incompetent to stand trial.
This court might consider the question
whether such an enormous difference as that
between life and death should be allowed to
hinge on such a small deviation to one or the
other side of the pathological dividing line.
Altogether it would seem that the court in
making its decision might care to be guided by
the precept of the law about which jurors are
instructed when they are about to decide on the
defendant's guilt. They are told they must find a
defendant guilty only when they find him so beyond any reasonable doubt. Likewise the death
penalty should be imposed only if, beyond any
reasonable doubt, it will be a deterrent and have
the effect of saving other lives. The doubt in this
case is grave.
If your Honor should decide in favor of a
non-parolable life sentence, it is quite possible
that some people who only know of the gory
details of this case from the media will not easily
understand your decision, and your opinion
would have to enlighten them. I think, however,
the jurors in this case, who have seen the whole
picture, would understand and approve the decision.' If your Honor should decide for the
non-parolable life sentence, the decision of the
court and the intention of the jury in this case, I
believe, would be in agreement, and substantive
justice would be done."5
'After the verdict, the defense had contacted the jurors
and asked them: "If the law had given you a choice-which it
didn't-of giving this defendant, after you found him guilty,
the non-parolable life sentence or the death sentence, for
which would you have decided?" Seven of the jurors responded that they would have given the life sentence. The
defense had subpoenaed thesejurors and asked thejudge to
hear them. The judge refused.
'A comprehensive analysis by J. S. Liebman and M. J.
Shepard of the problems posed by mental disorder to the
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P.S. The judge imposed the death sentence
and the case of Alabama v. Th. Whisenhant is now

on appeal.
In an earlier death case, handled by the
Southern Poverty Law Center, Alabama v. John
Jacobs, the defense challenged the constitutionality of the Alabama death penalty statute. The Alabama Supreme Court heard arguments on January 27, 1978. If the court sustains the challenge, the death sentence of
Whisenhant would be commuted to nonparolable life.
administration of the death penalty isabout to appear in the
George Washington Law Review.
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